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CKAJPTBR I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis begins with the assumption that all 
"neo-classical" economics represented an early stage of the 
long g slow development—s ti l l  going on today-of "mathemati­
cal economics" or what may be called a gradual "matheiratiza- 
cion" of economic theory. In a real sense the origins of 
uhis development are very old; only the "fruits" have been 
slow to appear and "ripen." Kany of the central problems 
of economic theory alv>iays have been g in one aspect, mathe­
matical in nature, i .e . ,  problems needing- to be studied with 
the aid of mtathematics. There, even in early times there 
ware gropings for something concrete to build upon.
hn €o:ample of the coraaon lack of command of mathe- 
rr;atics on the part of former economists can be demonstrated 
by the Ricardian—classical "law of diminishing returns."
The use of differential calculus Viould have provided the 
needed insight to explain the diminishing additional re­
turns of produce from more intensive cultivation of agri­
cultural land. Jis i t  was, Ricardo used words and arithmeti­
cal illustrations. I t  later turned out that the "law of
-?or a recent book dealing vh-th the early develop­
ment of mathematical economics, see Theocliarsis, Early De- 
veiopraents in Mathematical Iconomics.
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c.inrdniE:hing return s \vas only one special case of a much 
more general principle of marginal analysis \vhich led to the 
marginal revolution, matheiriatical economics, and a ll “neo­
classical** economic theory.
ilnother example that illustrates the relative short­
ness of the distance separating “classical" economic theory 
from •'matheraatical" theory is the fact tliat Mai thus foresaw 
the la tte r and expressed his belief that "fIwdons" (as the 
branch of matheraatics that is now called "the calculus" v?as 
then called) would come day come into use in economics, as 
i t  already had in physics and other sciences.
Although the development of the marginal concept 
and the introduction into economics of formal mathematical 
techniques do not coincide perfectly, there is enough coin­
cidence to make their separate treatment extremely awkward, 
ihuong the pioneers of the marginal concept—for example, 
Kerman Gossan, William devons, and Leon Walras—were also 
pioneers in the use of mathematics in economics. Among the 
earliest economists to use mathematics, only A. A. Cournot 
and A. J. 2. Dupuit seem to have overlooked the marginal 
concept «
Augustin Cournot*s pioneer work in mathematical
“Overton K. Taylor, .History ^  Economic Thought, 
(New Yorks McGraw K ill, 1960), p. 323.
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economicc is called P-'̂ .c'h<r?rc>.p>c sur les Principes Kathemati- 
jmis la  Thscrle _d s s P"? cl-ess os (1838). Although he never 
had a really systematic theo2*y> he covered most of the prob­
lems latoir taken tip by Walras and Pareto, and for the f irs t 
time utilised infinitesimal calculus in treating economic 
phenorciena. (The founders of the general eguilibrium mathe— 
rrmticaX method wex'e Walras, a Prencliman, and Pareto, an 
Italian. Since they both taught at the S'&dLss University of 
La-usanne, the label “'Lausanne School" is often applied to 
them and their students.)
its was mentioned, Cournot pioneered in the use of 
calculus, especially differential equations, to represent 
the functional relationship bet%veen prices and quantities 
sold in a competitive market. Cournot' s theory of the firm 
corresponds wdth the modem analysis of firm equilibrium. 
Cournot assumed that total cost and total revenue vary con­
tinuously wtth output and that the equilibrium position is 
that of the maximization of net revenue—total revenue mi­
nus total cost. In the contemporary version of firm profit 
meocLmization, marginal cost is equated to marginal revenue.
O
Both troatîTicnts arc essentially the same.
Cournot *s book v-̂ as bold for its  day, and some claim
^Philip C. Newraan (cd. ) , ÂD Economic
rhoucht  ̂ (hew York? W. W. Norton & Co., 1954), p. 451,
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i t  has no equal in the history of economic theory* He was 
the f ir s t  writer to define and graph a deraand function. Al­
though not interested in u tility  theory, Cournot assumed as 
a matter of course that the demand curve wmis negatively 
sloped. ‘ As the total quantity increased the added u tility  
from an additional unit decreased. In his analysis, Cournot 
begins with pure monopoly instead of competition and works 
toward unlimited competition.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the 
e;rtent to which Cournot ' s ?.echerches  ̂ has influenced the de­
velopment of economic thought and the writings of Leon 
halras in particular. This will be attempted by f irs t giv­
ing the reader a l i t t l e  background of Cournot's life  and 
works and then by oqplaining his famous duopoly problem 
aroused interest among later economists. Cournot's solution 
is based upon certain explicit assumptions, which Cournot 
failed to spell out clearly. Chapter III covers some of 
those assumptions that later economists read into Cournot's 
theory and the confusion thcit resulted when' the market 
failed to achieve equilibrium.
'̂ Ilark Blaug, IIqdagaâjc lltbiry I n  , (Home­
wood, jLllinois; Irwin, Inc., 1363), p. 313.
A. A. Cournot, hacherches .EUT JLts principes mathe- 
raatiquGs do la theorie des richesses (Paris: Hachette, 1838). 
Inglish translation by N. T. Bacon in Economic Classics (New 
York: ilacmillan, 1397).
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to be greater today than was earlier believed. Kis duopoly 
problera that could be e;<panded to oligopoly is very timely 
today in a business v.nsrld s%\7aying between pure monopoly and 
dree competition. The influence of Cournot*s concepts and 
methods is further deroonstrated by tracing the later develop- 
tient of the famous economist Leon Walras and his work on 
general equilibrium analysis.
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ci-%PT::R II 
3ICGl':Ji?Hia\L S:C3TCH OF AUGUSTIN COURNOT
Svary neopĥ ycie In econo.Tiics is well acquainted with 
the ;:undanc-mtal notion that quanti ty deau5.nced is a function 
of price. He is also fatiiliat .m the idea that a demand 
curve can be clrauti relating the two variables—price and
caiantitV;, and will be convex; to the origin. Few if  any,
however, are awere of the origin of these concepts in eco­
nomics. For their introduction we owe credit to an obscure
French nathematician, Antoine-Augustin Cournot. Further, as 
\ja  shall see, we must credit Mr. Cournot vn.th a great many 
other contributions as well,
Augustin Cournot was born at Gray, in Haute-Saone, 
France, in 1301. There ho received his earlier training, 
and later took special instruction in mathematics at the 
Lycee de Besancon. Me continued his mathematical studies 
at the Ecole Norraale in Paris, in 1834 he becarae Professor 
of Mathema'tics at Lyon, and the zolloiving .year Rector of 
the Academy at Grenoble. His most important viork. The 
: hthematical Principles nf jf:!; jlïiRary S2f. :-lea-Xth, T̂as pub­
lished in 1S3S. He surttoned to Paris as Inspector Gen­
eral of Btudies until 1854, when he became Rector of the 
Academy at Dijon. In 1862 he retired from active teaching, 
and remained an active researcher and writer.until his
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death in 1377,-
hlthough Cournot was a mathGraatician hy training, he 
io equally well hno’iai as a philosopher and educator. Kis 
rru.tharaaticul writing included his Tra ite dlenentaire de JLa
Calcul Infin itesiral, E:q:o.sl-
115 jls üheojaLg Çĥ r; et des Ihiol
Üui JL,.!-Q,r;i.gdllg ut dus ilLaltiis iis It, CcLcrespondence entre 1 *A1- 
üsJiZiS iît 2si Among his philosophical vrarhs we
rnd iZzaitD lic TrLchn.j.n ament iiOS Zde.es Eondamentales jzans
and Con si.derations sur Za 
d a rc h t lias  Xdliias i t  dlzs uv.ehement s  d u is  2 e s  mccnps I-todernes. 
His influence on Philosophy vTas substantial:
When Cournot is mentioned in histories 
of Philosophy he is most often referred to . .. 
as a rather obscure figure, standing outside 
the philosophic tradition of his time and 
place^ vet cccercising a considerable influence 
on the de'calopraent of tha later philosophy in 
France. Ke se'sms to be best known for his con­
ception of chance as inherent in reality in an 
objective way. Hut chance so conceived imposes 
definite limitations upon science, and Cournot 
is credited also for his effort to analyze and 
criticise rigorously the methods, the significance, 
and the bearing of economic truths.2
However, i t  is not as ci philosopher, educator, or
mathomatician that Cournot is  best remembered today, but as
an economist. He is  fulfilling Jevon*s prediction that he
Icournot, .hes.aanchas , jvp. üü» # P» v.
“Chester Townsend Ruddick, “Cournot*s Doctrine of 
Philosophical Doctrine,” The phi 1qsophi.GSul XLIX
(July, 1940), p. 415.
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“rauat occupy a reir.arkable position in the history of the 
s u b j e c t * I r v i n g  Fisher, who v.TTote the introduction to the
English translation of Cournot's most important work,
S32T liath&iatloues ils 2a Theorie iiss
21Che.S5.25vhich in English is  The Kath^m-̂ tical Principles 
.&f the .Ths;2.tY ..o.f Wstltbj, paid Mm high tribute*
JiltMugh some score of urriters had pre­
ceded him in attempting to apply mathematical 
processes to political economy, he was the f irs t 
to win substantial results* He alone of the 
early writers c::orts today a powerful influence 
on economic tMughte I t  io with him, therefore 
that any survey of modem irvathematical economics 
should begin.^
I t  seems only fitting  in view of Fisher's comments that 35 
years later, in 1933, the f irs t article to appear in the 
f irs t  issue of volxame one of 1erncmetr.ica, the journal of 
the Econometric Society, whose purpose is  the advancement 
of economic theory in its  relation to sta tistics and mathe­
matics, ;vas a tribute to Aû guotin Cournot. In this same 
issue Joseph Schuiapeter said*
* a * s t i l l  higher tribute is due to Antoins- 
Augustin Cournot who, wj.thout encouragement or 
lead, in what was then a most uncongenial envi- 
ronment, in 133S fully anticipated the economet­
ric program by his , one of the most
striking achieve.ments of true genius, to which 
we pay respect to this day by nearly always
. 3. Jevons, (4th
ed. ; London* Haci'.villan and Co. , 1924) p« jcd.x.
■̂‘Irving Fisher, "Cournot and Mathematical Econoinics, 
illis ilitrALLly iüï l:.ctmca:Lcs » XII (January, 1898),
o. 135.
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starting out rron thsra.^
'.Thile I t  seciras that Gouiniot's influence as an econo~ 
mist is unquestionable, Iiis IlathfiZiltlcsl Principles ûf .ths 
ZhibOJilc af i/ealth v.n2.s completely ignored by economists for 
nearly 40 years. Tharl:s to Walras, Jevons, and Boccardo, 
Cournot*s work was discovered and his theory and methods 
spread. Apparently discouraged by the lack of success of 
his 1-1 athor:a,,tj-cq 1 P:tinolples, Cournot later paraphrased i t  
using a non-si'rabolic approach and published i t  as Principes 
Üg jLa .Th^qrie dOb hi chess as in 1863. In the year before his 
death he published s t i l l  another revised version as Re\rue 
aorprqi re Doctrines dc.pr.cpigi.?.cs. But neither of these
works were as interesting and important as the original, and 
have since fallen into disuse.
-Joseph -Schuutpoter, *'The Common Sense of Bconometrics,”
3 con omet rj_ca, I January, 1933) , p. 9.
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CH21PT3R I I I  
COURi'TOT'S DUOPOLY PR03LET-Î
Luo-ustin Cournot, is credited VTith discovering the 
distinctive feature of the oligopoly prohlern. He also 
s?%3wed that with certain assuraptions a determinate equilib- 
riura solution is obtained for the duopoly problem, the mar­
ket condition of only tv,o sellers, and that this solution 
can be o:rtended to oligopoly.^ The main significance 
arising from Cournot * s work lies not in the determinateness 
of the solution, though, but in connection with legitimate 
criticisms of Cournot's solution. To understand why, we 
have to start by considering how the determinate solution 
is obtained, A realistic approach to oligopoly problems 
cannot be based on Cournot's theory, yet, to understand an 
oligopoly theory an e::amination of Cournot's basic construc­
tion is necessary-
Cournot's solution is based on the assumption that 
each duopolist believes that his rival will on on producing 
a definite quantity irrespective of the quantity he himself 
produces. I t  is apparent that each duopolist thinks he can 
calculate tlie quantity he should produce in order to maximize 
his profits v;hen these conditions erdlst. Each producer can 
obtain his own individual demand function under these
1
dee chapters vii and i:c of Cournot's P.esearches,
10
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circuiTista.nces by decucbing tho 'Zixed quantity of the rival’s 
output fro." the total quantity inclicatod by the roarhet 
de:nar.d function for each price. frora here he proceeds to 
equate his individual marginal revenue to his marginal cost. 
This is not, however, the reason the solution is determinate, 
neither duopolist is  likely to maJce the correct guess as to 
the quantity liis rival will produce, because the rival pro­
duces the quantity which marcimizes his profits on the same 
assumption vh.th respect to his rival's  behavior, and there­
fore does not keep his output constant. The pair of outputs 
obtained at f irs t cannot last, since each firm will change 
i ts  output.
The main feature of Cournot's model is that each 
duopolist continues to assume tlnat the other vri.ll not change 
his rata of output. As the tvo approach equilibrium they 
wri.ll be wrong, but whan they reach equilibrium they are 
right. 2» produces a quantity which ma:cLmizes his profits 
on the assumption that a will go on producing his present 
output. Now 21 adjusts his output so as to mâ cLmize his 
profits on the assumption that A will go on producing his 
present output, which induces h, to adjust liis output, and 
so on. that Cournot proved is that these adjustments f i ­
nally result in an output for A wfiich he can go on producing 
on tlie assumption that 2 will continue to produce his "pres­
ent" output because 2: v ill continue to produce an output
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Which justifies üs*s output on the assumption he makes,.This 
is  a circular argument: 2 must he in ecu!librium to be pro­
ducing an output vdiich is  truly justified on the assumption 
he ma>CGs about behavior.
In tl'iis model the two producers are “right" for the
i-TTong reasons. Each assusaes his rival is  following a policy 
of fiwed output while in reality each producer is continually 
adjusting his ovri output to orofit ma:ci mi nation. I f  thev
lave adjusted t?neir outuut to the simultaneous output
of the other i t  is  because each producer I'las not followed a 
policy of producing a fixed output disregarding his rival's  
behavior*
For a graphical proof of this refer to figure 1.
Figure 1
1 ' s output
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ThG ou'tput of Ü is iTieasured along the abscissa and 
the output of % is  measured along the ordinate. The curve 
indicating î*s output as a function of Ii*s output is and
the curve P‘ 2  c:rpresses ^*s ou’sput as a function of ^ ' s outr 
put. The shape of these reaction curves ir. gi\'cn by the 
postulate that each duopolist raaxirrises his individual prof­
its  on the assuri\ption that the other •will go on producing 
his "present" outpu't. Let us further assume that the demand 
function is  linear (which Cournot did not assume) and that 
producers face constant costs at identical levels (which 
Cournot did assume).
Both functions decline monotonically, or, the more 
the one produces, the less v ill the other produce because 
the rt'ore to the le ft v ill his assumed individual demand 
function lie . The intersection of the tv/o curves marks 
S'table equilibriuT;!,. To the le ft of the intersection ^ * s 
output falls and i ’s rises, v;hile to the right of the inter­
section fi's output tends to rise and ^*s to fa ll, so that 
equilibrium is restored in the event of disturbances. This 
rrust be so, for 'tust intersect vith the ordinate above 
1 *2 3« vnilo i t  must intersect vith the abscissa to the le ft of 
F2 * Point 1 shows that output of 2 which vjould induce & to 
produce no'thing, v/hile point 2 shows the output which 2 pro­
duces i f  li produces nothing* » The f irs t  of these tvjo quanti­
ties is  the competitive output for the industry and the
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second, quantity is 2 ' s monopoly output. The competitive 
output is greater than the monopoly output. The same analy­
sis applies to &'s output.
Since we assumed a linear demand function and con­
stant coetSjj the reaction functions of and are linear. 
Therefore^ the stable equi1ibrium point is  the only inter­
section point. In addition, given identical cost functions, 
the outputs of the duopolists xvill be equal. From these 
assumptions tlie aggregate duopoly output is t^vo-thirds of - 
the competitive output, while the monopoly output is one- 
half of the output under pure competition. On analogous 
assumptions for undifferentiated oligopoly, the aggregate
oligopoly output is r times the competitive output,
r 4. 1 2
where r is  the number of producers.
Reaction functions may be linear even if  the demand 
and cost functions are not as simple as assumed above. We 
begin by dropping the simplifying assumptions of the market 
demand function and the cost functions, except that we re­
quire the monopoly output of each firm should be smaller 
than WÛ11 induce the other producer to produce zero. With­
out this assumption the Cournot problem is meaningless be­
cause there would be monopoly. With this assumption points 
1, 2, 3, and 4 are s t i l l  as in Figure 1. These points
-̂ William Follner, lüâsa tha
nly h,hd i:iô,rhot ftruct:-,res. (new York : Knopf, 1949) ,
'Oo 60*
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stand for the outputs which the assumption predetermined.
The reaction curves wdll not be linear, but they will s t i l l  
slope downward. This follows from Cournot’s premise of rival 
behavior where a higher rival output means the lowering of 
one’s assumed individual demand function.
Therefore, the reaction functions will intersect, 
and at least one of these intersections will be stable.
(There may be only one intersection.) Cournot even implied 
that points 1, 2, 3, and 4 v;ere arranged in this manner. He 
also implied one unique c:nd stable intersection.^
I t  is Tviost important to note, that as long as firms 
make the Cournot assumptions of their riva l’s output, the 
analysis cannot be adjusted to make firms right for the right 
reasons, but instead the analysis v.dll turn out right for the 
wrong reasons. This leads to the problem of "leadership.”
If  producer si, knows that producer £ is producing along 
reaction curve he would not react along Producer ^
would instead select the point on wluLch would be optimal 
from -L’s point of view. .This point -would ordinarily be where 
11*3 output is  larger than £ ’s and would result in a higher 
total output, Likewise, if  H Icnows 2, is reacting along 
then, instead of reacting along he will select the point
on F-i wdiich is optimal frcm his point of view. This would
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probably bo to tloe le ft of the intersection point. Such 
procedures do not result in equilibrium, because when we 
assume they know each other"s reactions, we assumed avTay the 
earlier behavior assumptions.
I t  is possible, though, t'n . - prod-.:e-r -reuld act
on the assumption that the other reacts   g his reaction
curve whdch in fact happens. Tliis results in leadership 
equilibrium. If  Û knows that 2, reacts along F2  ^ut 2* in­
stead of anticipating reactions along F^* believes that ^
WÛ.11 go on producing ifhatever output he actually produces at 
the moment, then 6 v.dll be able to select the point along F2  
which is optbmal from his point of -(/lew, and this point vbLll 
mark equilibrium. likewise, if  2 anticipates reactions along 
Fj_, and 2 reacts along then 3*s optimum point along
will mark equilibrium. In the f irs t  case A is the leader, in 
the second case 2 is . These leadership equilibria are dif­
ferent from Cournot’s intersection-point equilibrium.
In its  essential points, the Cournot model can be re­
garded as the parent model for oligopoly analysis. This is 
not a result of Cournot’s equilibrium propositions, though. 
The intersection point in Figure 1 wall not e:<press equilib- 
riuit unless fints react (which is doubtful) along F̂  3,nd Fg* 
I t  is  possible that a firm would assume that the other is 
following a policy of fined output, but on the way to the 
equilibrium intersection—point i t  is bound to realize that 
i ts  ass'uiaption ŵ s wrong. This would destroy the validity
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of Cournot' s reactions functions and the analysis based on 
than. In addition  ̂ no single equilibrium position would 
last for long in a v̂ orld of shifting demand and cost func­
tions.
Cournot*s stability  proposition is related to condi­
tions V7hich move the systera away from the intersection-point 
without affecting the reaction functions. Equilibrium will 
be restored from such disturbances. The doubts which pro­
ducers have of the realism of their assumptions of a rival's  
behavior will cause a disturbance which maJces the system un­
stable» If  these firms, for any reason, change their assump­
tions about their rival's  behavior patterns, there is no 
t.c::ncLQncy to restore the Cournot behavior pattern. For example, 
i f  one producer anticipates a small output adjustment of his 
rival instead of the fixed output policy, there vriLll be no 
reason to return to the former Cournot behavior pattern. The 
Cournot assumption is merely one of the many assumptions a 
firm can maZce about his rival.
I t  v.r>ulcl appear that similar criticism could be held 
against equilibrium theories in general abstract certain »
properties of the real world and their fruitfulness depends 
on how convenient i t  is to isolate these properties and to 
treat them separately as problems of disequilibrium. A per­
son may be opposed to such arbitrary methodological distinc­
tions, but he would have to admit that they are not meaning­
less distinctions because these problems of disequilibrium
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are articulate aac significant. On the other hand, to pro­
pose that the problems o::cludcd from Cournot's duopoly analy­
sis should be treated separately from chose included in the 
model %70uld be meaningless. This implies that i t  is fruitful 
to develop a separate kind of disequilibrium analysis of the 
disturbances arising from firms assumàng their rivals do not 
follow a fixed-output policy. This further implies that the 
Cournot theory of the equilibrium point is not important, as 
"pure theory," but as a theory of imperfections.
Other anal^diical problems arise when we refer to the 
leadership equilibria developed from the Cournot model, 
here no firm acts on incorrect and arbitrary assumptions.
The follower believes correctly that the leader has adopted 
a policy of fixed output. The leader has adopted a policy 
of fixed output. The leader selects this level in full 
knowledge of the follower's reaction function. In short, 
the leader has the desire and the power to indicate the 
quantity he will produce and to keep on producing this quan­
tity . The follower raa:oimises his profits in full knowledge 
of tills . The leader selects his output quantity realizing 
that the follower will maximize his profits at that output. 
The loader chooses his output in view of the follower's be­
havior, and he also maximizes his profit at that output.
Toth firms in this case act on rival behavior based on cor­
rect assumptions.
On Cournot's assumptions the equilibrium is
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detcr^p.inatG not only for duopoly but for oligopoly with any 
number of sellers. I t  is determinate not only for producers 
selling substitutes but also for differentiated products.
If  there is product differentiation, the boundaries of the 
oligopolistic industry may be defined as the extent to 
which conjectural interdependence applies. Cournot did not 
discuss differentiated oligopoly but the reaction functions 
will have to be dov/nward sloping for substitute products 
too.
All intersection points of Cournot's reaction func­
tions share the weaknesses of the intersection for undiffer­
entiated duopoly. If  conditions are changed by the intro­
duction of more producers and by product differentiation, 
the equilibrium point s t i l l  represents a position from which 
each producer believes his rivals will not change their out­
put. Unfortunately no producer acts in this fashion and 
equilibriuu't will not be maintained.
A further problem that enters when more producers 
and product differentiation exist is the leadership equi­
librium. If  there are more than two producers the superior­
ity  of the leadership equilibria over the Cournot equilibrium 
with its  intersection of reaction functions no longer exists. 
The Cournot reaction function of each follower is based on 
the assumption thaa all his rivals produce a definite quan­
tity , no matter what he does. This is true for the leader 
but not for the followers. If each follower sets up Cournot
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réaction functions and lets the leader choose his output in 
view of these, then each follo:;er acts on incorrect assump­
tions about the other followers.
The Cournot intersection remains subject to the cri­
ticism discussed above, but leadership equilibria have the 
same properties as under undifferentiated duopoly. The 
leadership equilibrium rests on correct assumptions if  i t  is 
postulated that the leader has the desire and the power to 
keep on producing a definite quantity of his own choosing. 
Yet, i t  is quite arbitrary to postulate that the leader has 
the desire and the po '̂or to act this way. The leader might 
test the reaction of his rival to other methods of asserting 
his will.'^
'-Tbid.  ̂ p p .  56-71. Professor Tellner’s review of 
Cournot’s px'oblem is quite clear and complete. He rightly 
criticises the classical duopoly theory for postulating 
individual profit ma:d.misatiori on specific but completely 
arbiti'ary assumptions. Later in his book he acknowledges 
that the rivals recognize their interdependence but this 
does not mean that there is even a tendency tovTards joint 
raazcimi sati on.
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OF GOÜF:\ûT*ïï DUOPOLY PRIGS
2-.icra than a hundred yearn ago, Pvntoine Augustin 
Cournot Q-ave an unappreciative world his Rerheychen. Since 
that time many o t  his ideas have been absorbed into everyday 
economic thought* Alfred Marchall w~rote in the preface to 
the First Ddition of his :iri.r:̂ 2 .gph..es af .Economics:
* ...two kinds of influences have affected, 
more than any other, the substance of the views 
eizpressGG in the present book ; but their form 
has been most affected by mathenzatical conceptions 
of continuity, as represented in Cournot's Prin- 
jQîgiSpà Âss JLa itaear.Às dl&a xich^s.sas»
Under t?;e guidance of Cournot, . . . I  v;as led
to attach great importance to the fac t.. .th a t... 
the demand for a thing is a continuous function.^
In spite of the special attention that Cournot has
received in recent years, ir  seems to several economists
that the strength and weakness of one important feature of
Cournot's work is not yet fully understood. The feature
3hat they refer to is  Cournot's treatment of duopoly price. 
Professor A. J . Kichol of Duke University claims 
the lon.g'““:>revailing disagreement' '̂ on this subject is ini -4 Ci.
Àvlfrad Marchai 1, J3f llQDnPFSi.CS■ (1st éd.;
he'v York; Macraillan Co., 1350) pp.
t-.. u . ivichoi, 'Ci Ra-hppraisal of Cournot's Theory of 
Duopoly Price,** ODuxjisJL Of lùXUianiy, Vol. 42 (Feb­
ruary, 1534), p« SO.
3Cournot, Researches, chapter v ii, pp. 79-89.
""beginning vdth J. Bertrand's review of Walras and 
Cournot yc-urnal bus i'-svants (September, 1833) pp. 499-503.
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reality an unrecognized disagrearaent regarding a certain 
"institution" of the narket. (1) In sorae large commodity 
exchange markets, prices are both bid and asked; the prices 
are determined by bargaining between buyers and sellers.
(2) In the second class o f  markets, e.g., any retail market, 
prices are almost always named by sellers. Buyers scarcely 
ever get the opportunity to bid. In this market the buyer 
decides how much is to be purchased at any price quoted by 
the sellers. In this manner the buyer has an indirect in­
fluence on the price, but does not have a direct voice in 
price detern'd-nation. (3) The third class of markets is
where buyers name prices. Sellers are loft to determine 
the quantity to be sold at any particular price named by 
buyers. An example of this last class is the southern tobacco 
farmer  ̂ bringing his product to rtarket. A buyer from one of 
fhe large tobacco ocmpanies offers him a price. If the 
farrviar does not like the price he can try to get a higher 
price from another buyer or ha can take his tobacco back to 
the farm.^
In a. free competitive market any equilibrium price, 
whether temporary or permanent, is unaffected by the particu­
lar way in which prices are named, hhen buyers and sellers 
are numerous, and each individual buyer or seller has little 
effect on price, an equilibrium price is determined where
''NiChoi, iip. , p. SI.
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tha darn&nd and supply carves intersect. If the market price 
rises above this intersection^ the total quantity offered 
exceeds the quantity demanded. Then reductions in the price 
offers of tellers^ or lower bidding by buyers tend to bring 
the market price back to the intersection. If the market 
price fails below the intersection, the quantity demanded is 
greater than the supply. Higher bidding or advances in price 
tend to bring the price back to the intersection. Whatever 
the prices bid or asked, the market price tends toward the 
same equilibrium level.
In a purely monopolistic market, the way in which 
prices are named is of l i t t le  significance from the viewpoint 
of general analysis, il monopoly may either directly name the 
price or indirectly control the bidding by limiting the quan- . 
t i ty  offered to the buyers. The final profit is theoretically 
the same, regardless of the manner in which prices are an­
nounced .
I t  also appears on f irs t glance of little significance 
in the competitive dealings of two se llers‘vaLth many buyers, 
whether sellez's or buyers name prices. This turns out to be 
a key to the interpretation of Cournot's duopoly theory. If 
only buyers name prices, his theory is easy to understand* 
Assume that in a given market, the highest price (p), bid 
among buyers for any particular quantity (D) of a given 
coiTuaodity conforms with the following equations
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P = — D 4. 90.
5000
The dei-nznd for the coJTuviodity may be represented as in Table I .
TABLE I 
Demand Schedule
Quantaty offered Highest price bid
(cents)
150.000.  ....................................  60
175.000. .  ..........    55
lau,aOO....o o..*e . . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  ... .. .. ...50
a A 0 ij .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .« .. . . . . .  «. . . . . . . .  4 5
250 1000.  ...........................................  40
275.000.  ....................................................................35
..1 eu, O 0 u. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ... . . . . . . . .  .. ..30
325,000....................  25
350 , GOO...............      20
37 5,000. .  .............    15
400,000.  ..................    10
Qa assume that i t  is the custom in this market that 
only buyers bid and the sellers only determine how much to 
offer. To illustrate Cournot’s theory, we assume that there 
are only tuo producers, E and il, who could produce unlimited 
quantities under constant costs, jf’s costs are 20 cents per 
unit3 II ’2  only 10 cents. I f  the two producers combine into 
a monopoly only plant would be operated. To make the
greatest profit then, H and H could offer 200,000 units and 
would accept the highest price of 50 cents. If H’s cheaper 
fac ilities  are divided among a large number of smaller pro­
ducers, 400,000 will be offered, and the price bid would be 
10 cents, equal tc the cost of production per unit. I f  Ü
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ar.d ^ xnde.psriCen-tly try to make as much money as possible in 
competition with each other> the price, according to Cournot, 
will finally settle at an intermediate level between 50 cents, 
the monopoly price, and 10 cents, the price of unlimited com­
petition*
In tills iTiarket structure neither seller has a direct 
opportunity to name a price. bach seller has thepower to 
influence the bidding by adjusting the quantity he offers for 
sale. bach seller may independently try to exert his in­
fluence to his advantage. I f  he is unable to predict his 
rival"s future output, Cournot claimed each seller bases his 
calcula cions at any given time on the quantity which his r i ­
va: 1 is offering at that time. A series of adjustments may 
be necessary, and the ultimate result of these adjustments 
is the same, whether they are made concurrently or alternately,
when the equilibrium price is reached, each seller makes a
maximum profit in view of the quantity which his rival is 
selling..
’The same solution is obtained by applying cournot's
7
rormulas to this problem.
(1) f (D) 4. D̂ f ' (3) - = 0.
( 2 )  f (3) ~ 32f*(3) - = 0,
^Cournot, . c i t . , p. 81.
"̂Ibid. . p. 35
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( 3) D = ^2 2̂*
( f (D) -r ^) represents raarginai revenue. is
the na.rginal cost. )
The equivalent of f(D) in this problem is given by - 1 —D +90,
5000
;/ith constant unit costs ̂  Pq (1̂1 ) = 2 0 Dj_} 0 2 ( ^ 2 ) = IOD2 '
T‘h e r e f o r e,
(4)
ÜOIving î
(5) = 100,000; = 150,000.
(G) p = 40
brofessor Chamberlrn presented a new theory of duopoly
in which he assumed that sellers always anticipate each
3
other's actions. Chamberlin uses a model where there are no 
costs of production. His conclusions may apply to cases in 
%;hich both sellers’ cost schedules are exactly the same* but 
in most cases producers do not operate under the same cost 
conditions. For this reason the new theory may not be com­
pletely accurate. Cournot’s theory is applicable, no matter 
how great the difference in costs of production. I t  stands
as the best general analysis of limited competition when only
9buyers name pricos,
bid Cournot intend to limit his theory of duopoly to
"-b. H. ChiEur.berlxn, "Duopoly: Value Where Sellers Are
ew," miD ihliJlTllllc/ Jou.rna.1 of Economics. vol. 44, 1930, p. 83.
"hichol, op. c i t . . p. £7.
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
27
vrhere only buyers nan;e prices? In Cournot. * s treatment of 
pure r.onopoly, the monopolist seller named prices while 
buyers determined quant i t ies .When Cournot wrote the 
chapter on limited competition he included nothing to sug­
gest that ha might have changed any procedures. Many theo­
ris ts  speak of market price as if  i t  ware obedient to ab­
stract principles; that i t  needed no human voice or hand to 
proclaim i t .
Professor Nichol interprets Cournot as making an
unconscious change in his assumptions. Michol claims there
is an indication of the change in the form of Cournot's
12equation of demand. 'When treating monopoly, Cournot as- 
sumed D = h(p) ; in treating duopoly, the revers notation, 
p =■ f(D). These two equations may represent the same rela­
tionship, but when values of p in D = F(p) are substituted 
to determine corresponding values of D, i t  is an indication 
that the calculator is thinking of amounts which buyers ^vill 
take at given prices, i . e . ,  established by sellers. Cournot's 
analysis of monopoly confirms this. Opposed to this, if  one 
substitutes values of D in the right-hand side of p =f(D), 
to solve for p, this indicates one is tliinking of prices
Cournot, Researches. p. 56. 
“•^wichol, c i t . . p. 37.
Cournot, o;;.. c i t . . p. 55. 
p* SO.
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v.Viich buyers will pay for grven quantities. No conclusion 
should be based on such thin evidence, but i t  is  clear that 
Cournot had rn mind £; situation where sellers determined 
quantitéOS but did not compete with each other by quoting 
different prices. ''In this case,** said Cournot, "the price
1 4
is necessarily the same for each producer."*
This price is not one named by either seller, for if  
sellers name prices, the fact that one of them changes his 
price does not compel the other to do likewise. If  sellers
name prices either one may maintain his price at any level.
1I'dgeworth thowed in his problem,'"'' when sailers name prices, 
and sellers are few, a perfectly uniform price is  not a 
necessity» the perfect ui-itforirii'cy of price in Cournot's 
model is not explained, unless prices are directly deter­
mined by buyers. Any agreement between sellers is carefully
1 5
abstracted.“ Cournot's discussion is logical only if  i t  is 
assumed that both sellers accept the highest price bid for 
their combined offerings. Then, one duopolist can influence 
buyers by a change in the quantity he offers. This is the 
sane as forcing the price he desires upon his rival.
Cournot's chi of defender, Luigi Amoroso, also assumed
wbid. . p. 79.
"7^ Y. Sdc-ew'orth, ha theme tical Psychics, (London, 
1331), reprinted by London School of economics and Political 
le i ance (1 9 32).
•^^Courno'c, ot'. cit. ̂  pp. 79-60, 83.
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price charges :;ere brought about by changes in quantity. On
this, h.r;:oro30 confirmed Cournot's theory, adding new details 
17of his o’v7n. -is idgevra.ter pointed out, Amoroso, too, was 
unaware of the implied assumption that only buyers name
*: O
prrces.
Parero' s criticism of Cournot's mathematics is fa- 
mhiiar to those acquainted v/ith the literature of the subject. 
His view* of the conditional validity of Cournot's theory has
1 9
not been discusscd by any other ncriter.'" Pareto was not 
aware of the underlying assumption that only buyers name 
prices* He therefore introduced another assumption which, 
he fe lt, was a departure from pure competition, but vjas 
necessary to correct Cournot's problem. According to Pareto, 
each competitor is tc le t his rival sell any particular quan­
tity  the rival desires. For this, though, i t  is necessary 
to inquire how he may prevent the rival from doing so, es­
pecially in a marhet in which buyers name prices. The 
methods of prevention and their shortcomings are as follows : 
{1} Competitive advertising is not necessary, since 
in the Cournot problem uhe products offered by the tvTo com­
petitors are identical. (2) Ho seller can 3ceao his rival
.:. e e  ^ u i g r  ^ r t o r o s o ,  e " : t o n i  o r  éco n o m e.c *
(bologna, 1921), pp. 254. iae also Fconomlc Journa1  ̂ "The 
hathamatical economics of Professor Amoroso," I'J Vol. 32, p.402<
cgewortn, doiirne 1. :i4XII, p. 402
Chamberlin, nU;. , p. 95-96.
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from selling what ho wanrs, even if he accepts lower bids.
If  either seller strays from Cournot * s assumption and accepts 
less than the highest price bid, the other can do likewise 
and s t i l l  dispose of his product. One seller may injure the 
O'cher '.but this will not prevent th sale of any given quantity.
(3) If  one seller does dump a large quantity of his product 
on the market thus forcing down the bidding, this does not 
force his rival tc sell a smaller quantity. In the long run 
the rival may choose to restric t output, but in Cournot's 
mar;cet, only immediate effects are considered in adjustments.
In conclusion, i t  is false to say that Cournot's market "al­
lows" the o'cher producer to sell any quantity. Pareto was 
incorrect, for neither seller can prevent his rival from 
selling. Fo.r lac>: of power, each seller is forced to acquiesce 
in a division of sale.s. To monopolize the market by accepting 
a loss, or a profit less than the mazcimum, is discounted by 
Cournot's assumption tliat each seller maximizes profit on his 
immediate tran sacrions.
Cournot's assumptions would have been much clearer 
had he had the advantage of competent criticism during his 
own lifetime. huch controversy could have been avoided. As 
i t  was., the french economist Bertrand, ignored Cournot’s 
Conclusions and thought of a situation in whsLch sellers named
rCgrviizig _-'isher, "Cournot and Mathematical Economics," 
m huart.erlv Cc-u rn a I of f conomice. XII, (January, 1898), p. 124.
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'Jc'ç-£'.;crth considered Bertrand's discussion limited by "uni- 
rormity or p r i c e I n  Cournot's market, a uniform price 
was practically a necessity. Baretc must not have understood 
the simplicity of Cournot's analysis and therefore added an 
unnecessary assumption.
Opposed to th is, some readers have given Cournot more 
credit than his modsil deserves because they have seen examples
or his analvsis in the business vjorlc. Considerable ingenuity
has been used to f i t  Cournot's theor\)" to markets in which 
sellers name prices. Buch efforts fail to give a complete 
picture of the situation for a detail here or there is ad-
j ' To show hov' ridiculous such a market becomes can
best be shown by an e::ample of one of Cournot’s interpreters
Professor Zouthen wrote:
the oharactsriStic feature of Cournot's solution 
is really that if  i c is to ha correct, i t  must
;sumption that a price reduction 
of one :.'onopoliat vh.ll attract the
eorc easily and quickly tlsan i t  
'.vculd attract thie customers of his competitors.'*22
1 refessor i euthen is a poor interpreter of Cournot.
x.s pointed out, feuthen missed one of the most fundamental
features of Cournot' c model :
Cournot does not consider price changes on the 
part of the ruonop.olists as motivating influences, 
in itia l causes in his problem are alv/ays varia­
tions in cuantity, vhich automiatically bring
h, üp. jzit.., p. 47.
■■huthon, ...'robj.er'S 
■ v rfara, (hollay: London, 1930), p. 29
*̂̂ '-Lroc.erih 'Jeuthen d nms of .‘■hno'-̂ olv and Economic
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zhanc-es In price.
Professor ieuPhen also missed another important point.
Cournot was very e::piicit when stating that both producers
always sold at the same price. Edgeworth' s market has the
tendency of buyers drifting '*en masse" from one seller to an-
2/1
Other if  there is a difference in price. ' Seuthen assumed 
differences in p r i c e , a n d  then attempted to explain what 
Cournot has e^rclained by oerfectlv uniform orices. Changes 
in Cournot’s roarket are not small chang-es, either. Professor 
C eu then considered only very smr.ll price changes,^® which if  
for no other reason, make his treatment inadequate. 7dien 
price changes are very slight and one duopolist lage behind 
his competitor in reducing his price, it  nay be, as Zeuthen 
suggests, that the price leader gets all the new business 
wirrle the other duopolist only keeps the business he has been
CiO iL j, i ̂  *
If  price changes are mors pronounced, i t  becomes in­
creasingly improbable that the seller who is slow to reduce 
his price will retain all his previous sales. In Cournot’s 
model i t  may be assumed that the duopolists reduce pices si­
multaneously to the same level, or that one immediately
zh Schr.iecer, heire Theori.e 
bien, 173.
rth-, ianers Relating to Political Econo-
my. (Franklin e,. , 1925), Vol. I , p. 119
:eutnen, rg> _ci.-. , pp. 23-31.
, pp. 30-31,
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f olloivz D. of to 3 otoer. :':'! th the s o conditions,
ne:.-cher one hzis any acprociahls advantage over his rival.
hnothor fatin 'hth fsuthtn'e revision of Cournot is 
the nrccoss of ceci1lotion toward an oquiiibriun price. This 
osceilaticn involves not only rectctions in price, but also 
advances. hot then only considered half of his ov/n problem.
He introduced an original assurrption regarding the behavior 
of buyers when the price is lowered, but omitted their be­
havior when the price is raised. The only way to test the 
applicability of Cournot's solurion in a market where sellers 
name prices is uo consider all the necessary conditions, 
ouch conditions become- infinite, but since many critics see 
more than Cournot's analysis entails, we vjill examine the 
possibilities available.
To illustrate the poscible interrelationships let us 
ass'ums the same numerical exaraple as earlier, ii's costs are 
20 cents per unit, and h's are ID cents per unit. The equa­
tion for demand may be e;:pre3 sec' as D = -SOOOp 4- 450,000.
The demand schedule is thuss
d smar: d C chedu 1 e
Irice :,b--..ued "c Sellers (cents) Quanti tv Taken
60.  ...............  150,000
55...................................................................................175,000
56;     2 0 0 , 0 0 0
15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   ..............................225,000
U-0... .... o a . « . « ... ... .. ... e a t  ......2c0,Q00
35.............  275,000
20.  ................      .300,000
25..         . 325,000
20. .........................................  350,000
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In "che zirzn place, coth sellers raust alv/ays sell at 
■cne sarriG price, othervrxse- a coraplication is introduced which 
is foreign to Cournot' s problem. This assumption is generally 
made when two competitors compete.
In the second place, a very a rtific ia l method of chang­
ing pz'ices must be assumed. In Cournot's original theory, the 
price bid by buyers changes automatically with changes in quan­
tity . ht the same time, the price bid for the output of both 
duopolists is always the same. If  couz'not's theory is to be 
restated, in order to apply to a market where sellers name 
prices, the tv7o competing sellers must move their prices in 
the same direction at the same time and by the same amount. 
Without competitive bidding among buyers, there is no third 
force to bring U*s price and U*s price to any particular uni- 
form level. The unifcurmity of price that Cournot's equilibrium 
necessitates, can be maintained only by some sort of agreeraent 
or understanding between sellers. The agreements can be as 
followsi
1* In each particular stage of adjustiaent, one seller 
begins a price change, and the other iirumediately follows. In 
succeeding stages of adjustment U and alternate in accepting 
each other's prices until an equilibrium is reached.
2. In each stage of adjustment i t  may be imagined 
that both sellers compromise in the matter of price. The 
equality between the total arzount offered end the total amount 
demanded is not a necessity in any market except at an
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equilibriuL-i price. Rivals do not name prices with the purpose 
or inaurir.g the sale of each other's stoch. Such agreements 
at diseguilibriuît prices do form a series which finally re­
sults in an equilibrium price.
3. JL cormoination of steps 1 and 2 may also lead to
0*7Co urnot' s equi1ibr ium » - '
Changes in price from any of these caditions, instead 
of through competitive bidding araong buyers, are governed by 
assuiv.ptions completely foreign to Cournot's theory. In fact, 
Cournot carefully eliminated any agreement or understanding 
between s e l l e r s . T h e s e  conditions listed are highly im­
probably for the amount of co-operation required would be 
more naturally invested in a perfectly monopolistic combina­
tion .
Professor Michol claims that this difficulty alone is
sufficient to invalidate Cournot's solution in any market in
9 9which sellers name p r i c e s . a c m e  admirers of Cournot try to 
pass over this difficulty, so attention is now directed to a 
special system of lirsitation of sales necessary to the cor­
rectness of Cournot's solution when sellers name prices. 
Vilfredo dareto put forth this system. Pareto thought that 
sellers named orices in Cournot's market.
acncc, jZC" Cit*, p. to.
"'Cournot, hci'-icrch^ pp «
“^hichol, jpp. jrit.. p. 96 «
79-30, S3.
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Pcircto 1 : 1  ret stated his tec'nnical zrathematical objec­
tions to Ccurr.ot*s t he o r y , a n d  then in simpler terms tried 
to show that Cournot had really only solved an insignificant 
a rtific ia l problem, Paireto's ei-npose falls down in a market 
where buyers name prices. He does deserve credit for out­
lining some of the conditions which have to be met v/han sell­
ers name prices in Cournot's problem.
The crun of Tareto*s notion is mutual limitation of 
sales in deference to certain arbitrarily recognised "rights** 
of one's rival, iiccording to Pareto, if  Cournot's theory is 
correct, changes in sales of either competitor are made al­
ternately « In step toward the final equilibrium each seller 
is  assuned to limrt his own sales so as not to interfere 
v-dth the other's sales. When sellers name prices i t  is not
enough to assume, as Chaiaberlin suggests, that the less ac-
3Îtivo seller ‘“v.dll held his supply fixed."
If  Cournot“s solution is correct, the other seller 
also must not tales his r iv a l’s momentarily recognized share
a’.vay from him. To reach equilibrium the 
sumptions must bo carried outî 
1» Tach duopolist, in his turn, leads in changing 
the orice.
~‘"Tee
.■'cme I ,  Vol. IV, p. 503*
ôl.-'VChamberlin, ci t . , p. 12 •
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2. The I'ival duopolisc in aach step Irrjzedlately 
iollox’s the price change.
3. hith each ad jus tirent the price leader only takes
up the slack" in the nev demand price. He does not inter­
fere -uith hrs rival 's old quantity sold.
4. In each new adjustuenu the less active duopolist 
cell no :ricre uhan he sold in the period irttediately preceding 
th a ad j u strient.
5* lubjcct to theseÿ each duopolist calculates a new 
price to maxxmise profits.
fd.gsKorth as suited each seller %-t>uld cut into the sales
of his rival by quoting a slighcly lo'..'sr price. Ignoring this
assuitption* the iraprobahility of any such series of events 
leading to equilibriura can be shown by contrast with a simi­
lar serres of steps without a rtific ia l limitation of sales, 
hssuite price is quoted and that neither competitor makes any 
effort to attrsLct business away from his rival by quoting a 
lover price. buxther assuice than each seller sells at the 
price of the moment uhe quantity which buyers ask of him. 
lince buyers Ixavc no preferenco for either seller when the 
product is identical. they ma;y 3:e assumed tc divide tlieir 
purchases between the -c\-:o sellers equally.
The fact that one seller may be slower than the other 
in changang his price does not alter thbs result for few 
buyers become immediately aware of differences in price. In 
c^ddition- if  v:e assume that buyers act rationally, the fact
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■tha-c or.G o::::ors bo.yars more than half the total
quantity ôomanloà at the price of the moment ■vm.ll not by 
atcolf cauce bayera ac a group to depart from an equal 
divicion of 'üieir to ta:, pure toi roe. Therefore, neither 
duopolist can cell more than half of the total quantity de- 
mandeci at ctiy price at which his rival also is selling 
unloss hie r i t a l ' s sales are limited to 1ess than half of 
the total q u a n t i t y  demanded. hither duopolist can prevent 
his rivsfl from selling more rhmn half if  he offers half him-
3 O
self, assuming the both will sell at the same price.
Tn Cournot *3 oric-inal problem t'nere v;as no need to 
use cdffcr'cnt symbols for the quantity offered and the quan­
tity  sold. Trie was dcternuLned by competitive bidding so s.11 
goods offered may be assumed to be sold, no matter what 
ez'lco. The use of D-, &.nd to represent quantities offered 
and quantities sold must be restested when applied to a market 
in wbàch sellers name prices, bhcn sellers name prices the 
total quantity offered is not necessarily equal to the total
ruant i f /  sold, arc cot at ocruilibrium.
Cournot * s theory assumed that each seller determines 
:ho cpuantity he will produce tâth the purpose of influencing 
:he bedding of buyers. v.'he.n applied to a market where sellers 
mere oricc-3 the determination of ouantities must deoend on the
‘'-Pichol, .ap. cit. ). p-
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arbitrary concessions on the part of one or both of the com­
petitor o. In this cast, each chccpolist has a direct and pre­
dictable influence on the sales of his rival, even when they 
sell at the same price*- hither one rp.ay sell more than half 
of the total quantity demanded, if  his rival limits his of­
ferings to less than half the tota.1 quantity demanded.
Professor Nichol therefore assorts that i t  isincorrect 
to apply Cournot‘s solution to any rra.rhet in v.hich sellers 
name prices* Under these conditions, the solution is depend­
ent upon (1) an impirobablo oyster.-, of changing prices, and (2) 
a more improbable system of limitation of sales. Sellers may 
m-cntion or suggest prices, but this is not important as long 
as prices are ciroct.ly determined by competitive bidding among 
buyers.
For many years economists accepted Edgeworth's unfa­
vorable judgment of Cournot’s theory, not realizing Sdge%-7orth 
failed to recognize the conditional validity of Cournot's con­
clusions. horo recently, however, Idgeworth's conclusions
3 5 ■have been criticized by many econcrûlsts. Edgeworth should 
be given some credit for he x-/as consistent in assuming that
1 cho 1, tip. Jtit * , p. 103.
Oniformity of price in Cournot' s problem is depend-
o)..t on the more ftr.dtm-ental assumption that only buyers name
p r a  C C . V  «
fee ooso'oh IcI'-umoeter, 1' . -7 » , Vol. 39, o. 369—70; 
f. h. Chamberlin, Vol% 44, p. 72-79 (jsp. jcli" )
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r.=inr.e prices, and buyer a ce'cerrûine qu-antitês. The 
ci.v;r.arcncu bcuv/ocari Zdgcwort.b.* and Cournot ' c duopoly dis" 
cuaaion bel in Oo%-;n to the suppooftion that one man ' s sales 
retain constant, or that his price remains constant. The
cuostion is one of whether the rodel is realistic inasmuch 
as i t  conforms wàth the institutions of buying and selling# 
i t  is  a CO raton observation that when a few deal with 
runy  ̂ the few alitost al\;ays name prices. One among many 
does not expect any price he may offer to be taken seriously. 
The le.ch of organisation keeps the multitude from having a 
direct voice in price determination# Its influence arises 
from the quantities i t  buys or sells. Bertrand and Edgeworth 
recognized t'nis fact, as Cournot must have. Perhaps this is
j.K̂ scn Cournot failed to explicitly state it as one of
h-‘ils assumptions# This middle-ground that Cournot's duopoly 
covers lies between pure monopoly and pure competition. For 
this reason any statement pertaining to either one must be 
modified when applied to duopoly.
Cournot deserves cs'edit for recognizing, long before 
anyone else, that duopoly.was a problem distinct from monopoly 
or uz'ilimiacd competition. I t  appears, though, that Cournot
:geworth, m.r> n il. , p# rub.
sLy dsîtxntl jceï >
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actually got no further than a description of a soru of double
O p
or rr.ultiulG auction sale.
o ,:.geuortn. rononi c u oi'-rnal * 3CC{I% ̂ op* cit., p. 402.
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, V 'Ji  i*-*C uo*.-^ T
i-aul A. LExnuelKoii once rorc.erJced on the role of Cournot 
the hi3 t o r o f  g
. .  n o  V ;OU. 
-;.r: 1 % ' 1
:o c.eny that Cournot, writing 
analvtioc. 1  oo'w’or and fresh­
ness tnat is hraathtaJcina? Cut who in his 
right siinh could argue that Cournot had been 
a great force on the history of ideas..*?
Iticopu through possible inciract influence 
of his teachings, Cournot's i:aps.ct on Ideology 
mu sr. surely have been nec'ligible.
preliminary ccriparison of Antoine Augustin Cournot * s 
tht ( 1338) to .boon ;:alra,s ' 7'h.euer.ts ( 1878) suggested 
that Cournot's influence on the history of ideas is much 
greater than Cairuelson believed.
hlrhiough a ll of Cournot's publications and some of 
his mathomatical treatises give evidence of economic thought, 
i t  is scattered, fragmentary, often merely illustrative or 
suggestive. his words ware usually uritten to e;-cpress some 
other noneconomic idea, and generally were of l i t t l e  signi­
ficance for the dove1opmcnt of economic ideas. Three of 
Cournot's economic works would therefore provide the logical 
focus of attention for any such investigation.^ Further
-haul Jarm clson, "Economists and the History of Ideas ,"
h;i_t.lôlil Ihfiicrgh:; lihilLtU, h-arch 1962, p. 5.
-ton ’v. h.'y.nto, ‘'Cournot's "'c cherches t Some Insigh ts  
n  i t s  Influence upon the Development of Economic Thought,"
.Iv _hiet_grn Igyingwi^ fhkiHf 1, Vol. I I ,  no. 3, Summer 1964,
>. j. 9 a « /: 'y °
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C o u r n o t :  ‘ a z u n c c i . i c i t a l  G c c n o r a i c  d o c t r i : : e s
3■■rarG cc.nGG.lnGc'; in hcc "-rcnnnnnn-c'. vritli merely cifferent.
5
forms in tnc incLrrrlinon ■" and d-r:i::n In pointing
.nonce or Cournot ' s doctrine and rratnenatical 
:hod on I'nlras, attention %-zill cc concentrated on Cournot's 
tnrncrrrr. In loo,: ci.no at nalrs.s, t-a --jill e: rami ne his
“ since this contains the foundation of his reputa­
tion in the development of economic ideas#
Cournot recognized the corapleicity of the economic 
system and. the intcrdGpond.ency of its  variables. In order 
to solve thsTG he realised that i t  i.ns indispensable to te:<e 
the entire system into considoration. This is precisely 
t.'hat : alras later did. Like the post-llarshallians, Cournot 
'furcher believed that this surpsvssed. the posers of mathe­
matical accalysis and. p<ra.ctical methods of calculation, since 
the nuriber of varie.'ties \;as infinite.
In order to fully appreciate C'ournot ' s performance 
in his famous chapters on the lam of Demand and on lionopoly, 
i t  is necessary to remember that mathomatically-orientcd 
\;cr::G :ee.re not received as such  ̂ but more judged on litera.ry
Î 1 1  birûri-finn (paris: Hachette, 1833) .
..1 T. façon in Classics (Hew
1337).
£.as (Parisî
G. e n  e t  t'.
"faon ,.‘alrao, ZLzn'lfs lu ll-Dlf ILtCitxilCh> (Great 
.ri tain : loyal :Jconomic iociety, 1354) trams, l’illiam Jaffe.
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czylo, Tl'J-s has special significance for laatneraatical v;orks 
of Couraoo‘s since lack of sufficient literary trans­
lation nsay have ten dec to suppress dissemination of concepts 
originating from one mathematical economists, and retarded 
development of economics in general.
Cournot v.as aware of this problem when he published 
his hechcrches but s t i l l  intended to treat the subject matter 
of polioical economy in a theoretical manner by means of 
mathematleal analysis*
But the t i t le  of this T.ork sets forth 
not only theoretical researches; i t  sho\7s also 
that X itmend to apply to them the forms and 
syzbols of mathar;:aticai analysis. This is a 
plan li'cely: 1  confess, to draw on me at the 
outset the condemnsation of theorists of repute. ^
Indeed i t  did. I t  is therefore surprising that al­
though his hacZesrchos received such a chilly reception in 
economic circles^ its  influence had a direct and demonstrable 
impact upon halras and his hJLflxttifeJi • The remainder of this% 
chapter '..rill attempt to analyte the entent of Cournot's in­
fluence upon oalras»
fcfcro Xalras ever thought of becoming an economist 
he studied Cournot' s fecherches. mt 19, in an attempt to 
correct a mathemttical deficiency that kept him from entering
eg school, dalras road, learned, and digested Cournot's
^Cournot, .gp. jomt. , p. 2 .
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« Con sleeping roLc laCor eccncn̂ ic achiûvemants i t  
cr iunaoc tnat ?;o f ai lac the cncr-i* herhaps the study of 
■.c::'-?h::?: onlv aided in the studv of theoretical
... . 3' «.  ̂. iUi, V, i
Ten years later .'?alras puhliGhed one of his earliest 
oconoi.tlc *vorhs« I t  was incencied to be a review of Cournot's 
f but mainly covered the Teoherchos. In the years 
that folio tree g Tairas investigated the he cherches several
9
more timesj, out those investigations %;ere never published.
In those studies ho vra, 3  concerned with Cournot's criticism 
of supply £.nd demand. The mctlicds used in these unpublished 
manuscripts is nothing on the level of the analysis contained
ht.iras was al:;ay3  an.ed.ous to s Isa re his ideas tdth
Cournot on the applrcability of mohc.:eatical principles in
u r\
economics, h.s Jaffe dis cove red — ./a Iras wrote to Cournot 
in 1373 and invited him to corntent on his newly written
.CO of e::chtnge* In the same letter dalras asked 
preparing his .dlactihty for publication.
t ■"■ '.ras fob 11 shed and Tairas
"T-'lanttf yg;. ü ü . 3 p. IS S.
» »■ » O  V .»  «.
Wts'v e ..Italic Januar-y 1952, pp. 5-33.
npubliohed Letters of Leon Tairas,"
0 : 0  ' itvct,..:. -.-honoy-.y, Vol« 43 (1935) , pp. 192-93.
G, “Unpublished Letters of Leon Tairas,"
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he ciECUSsod its  relation to the
doEionstratinçj that this new work used rrathernatics 
on a siw.pler scale. .Zairas also pointed oat that his objec­
tive w£;s to trea.t the interdependency of economic variables 
under static conditions. In addition, competition was used 
as the general case and monopoly considered special. In 
conclusion, : Zairas claims to have borro-ued nothing from 
Cournot but his method, which pror.'p'sed him to mention Cour­
not, since Cournot's v7ork had received so l i t t le  recognition.
.L  ̂ “ i .C. #.#, u.etin Cournot for
Vi n r /swm 7 ' ’• 1 'm y “‘■"ry t calculus of functions
c 1  a.bo ra ti  on o f doctrine. I ha.ve
Iv acknowlcdnod t: :i s fact in mv firs t
essave and on cvorv suitable occasion ever 
since.--
tairas ' work, like Cournot, v.-as not well received
in trance. uhss :p.ight have tended to malce tairas feel
closer than ever to Cournot since they both attempted to
find useful application of mathematical principles in eco- 
13nomics.
Cournot had developed a steitic partial equilibrium 
analysis to show thac the prices that result were an appro::!- 
.ration that too:-: l i t t l e  account of secondary cmnges in 
economic variables. the nctliilkr pgiychyiS assumptions lim- 
itec. -%rice effects to wi.at he called changes of the f irs t
o. 197.
.■'.oy.al hco.iomic ..'ociety., 1954) trans. '..'mi. Caffe, p. 37
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crJ.Gr. C'cc icfluccco of a change in à era and for a good on the
pricec and quantities of other c:oods transacted were noted
out cn.itr.ed foar the saZce of siitplicity. Cournot was aware
that his systa.'i '/as merely an a;ppro::ination  ̂ but argued that
isq:ortant price influences were derived by the interaction
of do-vand and supply on the good itse lf. Other influences
introduced error into the price determination, but since
their import css ce is continually decro-asing, the error is
slight. itch a partial equi 1  ibriur.i approach was able to
*1 /►
a ro : :i cl on or
Cournot started witli hie doctrine of mutual inter- 
dependency of economic variables and consistently repeated 
i t  throughout his red■te.CidCtiij:-« the development of the mathe- 
r.atical pr.tnciples of tise theory of x/aalth was based on 
Cournot' s concent of relative value which emphasizes mutual
dust s.s i-'s can assrgn srtuation to a poxnt 
by ref ore:.ce to other points, so -;e can assign 
value to e. coor.iodity hy reference to other 
cort'oditios. on this sense there are only rela-
ri VO valuer. fut : .'hen these relative values 
change, we rorccivo plainly that the reason
variation may lie in the change of one 
or of the other or of both at once.
f t  is interesting to nets that Coum-iot's entire 
otor on rolasive and absolute value v/as reprinted in
:o. Is 0-51
q,
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.ret. (pp. 153-3) cUicl GGconcl (on. 451“
3 , 0  thr r.'-c. or Iris price theory- analysis, Cournot re- 
vicroc his achievraocnos, s'nowing their partial equilibrium 
nature-
3o far have stuiicd hovr, for each con- 
nociity It'' rtso lf, the law of c.onana in connec­
tion \.t.th uhc conditions of production of that 
CO:'too City cleterrainos the price of i t  and regu- 
ls.tcs the incomes of i'cs producers. :7e con-
sidored as given and invariable the prices of 
other picocucorsi tut in reality the economic 
oys'cers is a \.'’hole of which a ll the parts are 
connected s.nc. react upon each other. . .I t  seems, 
therefore, as if ,  for a complete and rigorous 
solution of the problems to some parts of the 
economic system, i t  were indispensable to texlce 
the entire sys'tem in'to account.
healiring tliat acjus'cmon'ts in one market might dis­
turb equilibrium in another, Cournot employed a partial 
er'uilibrium analysé s under yfviirbL.S ptrib_'..''s assumptions, 
since halras had studied, the he ezpected Cournot
to oay-anc the theca~y to encompass the entire economy. When 
this did nc'c hao'-’cn with Cournot's publication of Principes
ra ticired him for not completing a definite 
17
«tm I ̂ mm th ih *5" ̂ —k. «i. dt V- >
theory of ê ichango value.
dho reason Cournot did not complete such a theory 
was beca'use he believed i t  CLathematically impossible.
t. _ »*• 'W- 'w V-Ï r- 4 ,—, r '.̂ .1T V ■ rr O'S-t dÇ lv3
ndu desw T T-
.dim “CO
-h -91» i'
'Princioes ds la
. juallet 1CC3). -pp n: :: to the 1938 reprint
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CüZT.parcd -co Cour rot, trougCi, '..-alras vras a poor mathematician. 
C.'cvc-roholc;:;o ho able to algebraically set up an équilib­
ré uir. syetorri by simply using different assumptions. Cournot's 
general equiiibriuza system was based on explicit empirically
grounded equations for a ll the goods and services in real
. ^ Idmarkets.
but this would surpass the powers of 
mathematical analysis and of our practical 
methods of calculation, even if  the values of 
a ll the constants could be assigned to them 
numerically.
The reason given for Cournot’s inability to expand 
has model of determining exchange rates to formulate a gên­
eras ecur j.iarium mo dor was the moor receotxon of his
: cherche s > Cournot's analysis consisted of proceeding
from the simple uo the complex. Then xiis partial equilibrium 
analysis was rejected he saw no reason to proceed to a more 
CO male:: theory. Courzeot had hoped that the essence of the 
heehcrs'-hcn might appeal to contemporary mathematicians, but 
this also vras not the case. He therefore turned to writing
textbooks and rruithost-atical studies until he developed a
■croilic evo disercor* "
i t . ,  p .  1 9 9 ,
"̂ -'Cournot, ipp. oix., p. 127.
y ■
* Ji W
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Cournot never completed his general equilibrium analysis so 
i t  was lout to dalras. 31even years after reviewing Cournot's 
in 1362 : Zairas published his elements « which tooh
Cournot’s analysis and developed i t  to show the interaction 
of cc-oncraic variables vrlthin a system.
In attempting to e:-pand on Cournot's demand theory 
z.'alras ran into problems. Cournot's theory established, on 
empirical bases, a functional relationship between the price 
of a -gocd end the quantity taken. This made i t  a ceteris 
ri "-■v.n cv3i':struct and therefore of l i t t le  use in developing 
a system of mutual interrelationships among variables includ­
ing quantities d-maandec and prices paid. In the second place, 
lalrus thcuc-ht Cournot's demand function did not explain the 
origin of e::chango value, t'alras realised that Cournot's 
demand function pertained to two goods. Then the demand 
curverepresenting the amounts demeanded as a function of 
price^ ’v.-as used for two or more goods i t  became merely an ap— » 
pro:uLmaticn. Cournot was aware of this and indicated that 
demand was a function of the price of the good and of all 
ether goods in each market.
Cournot ' s dnvnnd was a function of u tility  and the 
price of the good. iince demand was derived from the market,
\.'hatever factors caused i t ,  there was no necessity to e>q>lain 
demand beha.vior in the r.iarket. He thought i t  impossible to 
discover the causes of demand because u tility  vTas unmeasur­
able.
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a funct.icn of tho quantify coasuned. d'aïs rarofo (synonymous 
v;ifa marginal utaiity and diminishing as consuispt-ion in­
creased required ee.cn consumer to mazrLmiza his satisfaction 
(total u tility) in cons'anption by altering the quantities 
consumed at different prices. This made demand a dependent
varia?sle. The demand function of a consumer for tvso goods
92is thereby derived from his u tility  schedule.“
hairas taciilcd the problem of measuring u tility  after 
Cournot failed. He devotes but one page to the problem and 
solution. -ihis is in Les son S uh his u tility  or "v/ant
curves."
above analysis is incomplete; and i t  
seer.is impossible at f irs t g"lancô  to pursue i t  
fur tine r; because intfsnsiva u tility , considered 
absolutely, is so elusive, since i t  has no direct 
or m.easurablo rclationsibp to space or time, as 
do emtensive u tility  and the quantity of a 
corm.ccd'cy possessed. drill this difficulty is 
not insurs'ountablo. .:'e need only assume that 
such a direct and measurable relationship 
does eicLst, a.nd \-e shall find ourselves in a 
po si tics; to qi'se an enact math ora t  i c a 1  account 
of tha respective influences on prices of e:c- 
t:r:sive urrlim'- and the in itia l stoch possessed.
I shall > therefore, assume the e:sistence 
of a standard r.ieasurp .̂of intensity of uants or 
m u G n s i v c  u t i l i t y .  . .
bs.is is as far as halras over vent with the u tility  
urcmcnt mroblem. hot onl̂ /' did ho accept Cournot's
hhlii., p. 2 0 1 .
/alras , Up. ÜLÜ., p. 117.
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c o n c i u ^ i o n c s  b u t  h e  c o i v i p u r e d  h i e  c a r i v e d  c s : r i a n d  f u n c t i o n  t o
bhic is precisely the equation which Cournot 
posits a priori in his hccherchcs sur les prin­
cipes rsitherintiques de la théorie des richesses 
(1G3S)j and \7hich he calls an equation of demand 
or sales (dchpt.) I t  has a wide range of useful 
application.
..hile wor3:ing on his dotand function, /Zairas en­
countered another problem that Cournot had covered» This 
was the prohlmt of continuity/. Cournot had held that, as 
the narhet e: span do-d and became more efficient, people with 
different tastes and incomes assure continuity in the demand 
function. but Walras' demand function urns based on nonag— 
gregative u tilitv  functions rather than observations. Me
fell bah: on the e:reuse- that Cournot used in hi:
mathematical models'—that the aggregation of individual da-
9 5eiand f'tziceions only appro:sLmatcd a continuous function.
In .'Zairas ' two-goods model of oquilibrium he used 
Cournot‘s demand function. Mowover, there x-ra.s a major dif- 
f cron CO in uhc ways in v.hich each used i t .  _ loth Cournot and 
ZZalras dealt vhth the quantaty demanded as a function of 
price. tairas did uhsLs because there were only two goods, 
one of ".vhich was the r'smorr.i::e (value set for the good in 
of orice). .Zalras' demand function worhed for any
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ar o" gcccc clnco tha quantité' o'Z tha good concxmed x-.̂ s 
a. :"v.:-.ctior. of tho pricos of oil other c-oods facing the con- 
rv-'.'.or. fh^refora, ..'£.l::r.r dovelogad a u tility  approach voLth 
price a, dependent varia'olc. for three- or more goods he as~* 
sum ad given given prices. l.c: rover, .’alras fe lt that ccn- 
s'u.-ption alone did not entirely determine individual u tility  
functions and tharehy demand curves. ”o therefore returned 
to his ohservacions of consumer hehavior as the source of 
tho demand, function.
he shoves, Cournot provided '..'alras vrLth a statement 
of the qonor-al oquiZ.ihrium problem and the demand theory for 
its  development. i'rom this ..'alras v;as able to create Isis 
theory of subjective value* 'The influence of Cournot upon 
.:'a.lres can furth.er be seen if  me looh into the concepts 
and method of tho e cher cher that v/cre later used in v7alras '
Cournot used the :vanhematica 1 approach to mahe poli­
tical economy laoro scientif_c* In marmot models preceding 
Cournot, demand, supply, und price had been clearly stated. 
Cournot, hov;c-ver, xmsntoc. to go I'Cyond the specific marhet 
e..:dol appro ech c.nf build so.no general propositions around 
demc.nd, supply and price- to do this, he stated the economic 
r''.lationshrps cf demand, supply and price by the use of nathe* 
matical irevbolc* In emprnsssng mho variables this v.t.y, he 
able to cnov: ul'o functional r:.].c.tionship of one or more 
ss she ct/u:.r varial'los -without idcntif'••'ing the oarticular
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ücrr:; c:" v.hc Ccurr.ot inc^icated that
a "ica c a fan et ica c:: tho cacaacl :Zor a cora.ioâity %-.â th the 
acuatiot -■- ~ h (Z) . Cocraoc c i5. aot have to cpecify all 
t h e  cea.ct iorr.AC oi the iuactica oc icaaac upon price, al­
though he coulcl at ate the function in a raatheraatical equation 
and then discuee eonc of the character!etico of the function, 
itch functicnal no ration a i.ave rne added advantage of clearly 
indi caring nucual intardependenciec of coo no;,lie variables, 
jar.u 113.ntou3 equations aloe clearly shot that ceraand and cost
-i-y- c ' *• d , . 1 - r"- '"."'d. r. r: d-' ' "h {'*̂'̂'7 Î 1P_V  ̂ -V C.- "W-& ."ta '  .w • ~“j «i.<a A * #i# 'W«<.» X Vî  wL# X X
n  and r h i n h i n ~  i s  a r t r i h a t e d  t o  C o u r n o t  since i t  did
fore the niner con kh cenuur' ,̂ The studv of such
rach'i c n a t i c a l  n o t a t i o n  i n  the .,__iCL:i.'.ihL:hLf is claimed to have
g i v e n  ' h a l r a s  t h e  foundation upon vicich h e  built his analysis
r 1 n '*1*—'' % '  ̂ ' i'** r'V ; ■*%■-.*!■” ~ V" «w Co «U W.» CL MM • -b  ̂. i ® '-w> Cl ̂ k L '-M- C. X » '-M. C. U. i X
Cournot founded a  d i f f e r e n t  hind of mathe- 
r r . t i c a l  c e e n c n i c o  v h i c h  i s  based on t h o  fact 
that t i i o  h o r n s  o f  t h o u g h t  o f  h i - ' - h a r  analysis 
c a n  b o  a p g l i c d  -/try 'roll t o  a n i ' u b o r  of economic 
p rc terti: a. t h o s e  f o r t s  o f  hieher analysis allow 
t h e  a  nVC a t i g  a t  i o n  t o  b e  c o n t i n u e d  at such a point 
w h e r e  s e a  : - n c r  l o n g  f a i l s  b cessas c of its  clumsi­
n e s s .  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  f u n c t i o n  oealsts patently 
o r  l a t s n t l c ’ i n  t o s t  purely c c o n o t i c  c.rguments and 
n r  f a r  as -i l i e  t a s h  con si sts i n  cotprehonding the 
g e n e r a l  r a loticnships b c t u a e n  variable quantities 
n n i  i n  .aeh .a .c ing  h r e a .  t h  ;  l a t t e r  e;s m u ch  as is 
p o u s i h . o ;  u v . t h  regard t c  t h e i r  variation, inathemati- 
c a i  a n a l i u i s  i c  £ . b s c l u t c l y  t h e  suitable instru­
m e n t .  h e  m o v e r ,  t h e  description of economic 
r e l a t i o n c h b u i c  in s '  "s tc:.as  of simultaneous equations
• > I, , p. 203-4,
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:Ly. ;p::ov'^c :iz a survĉ y o f  the forner that
er„,_-;.ot ':a chaalaac an such a precise forci in any 
c cher v.-c.y--̂ '
. - a l r a c  a i s c  e n . p i o y c c  t e c r e . i p a e s  of graphing that 
h o a r n o t  h a h  c o v a i o p o d a  t h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  s e e n  throughout
i t  is c l e a r ; ,  then that ha I r a s  o h t a i n e d  much from 
C o u r n o t  i n  t h e  \ ; a y  o f  c o n c e p t s  c .nc  m e t h o d s .  The extent to 
\ ; h i c h  C o u r n o t  '.rao h e l p f u l  i n  t h i o  r e s p e c t  in the writing of 
. . a l r a s *  f l : ~ m a t . . r  c . m  h e  suam ec:  up a s  followsi 1 ) the dis­
c u s s i o n  c f  r e l a t i v e - and a b s o l u t e  value, 2 ) the extensive
e  o f  C o u r n o t ' 3  d s the solution of the prob-
.em of continuity> 4 ) the c::planatory val'ue' assigned the 
mrst derivative of a function;. 5 ) tho i.tr.ieasurability of 
itilitVf C) the use of a  s t i i i d i n ' h i s s  7 ) t h o  combining of ra-
i o r  w i t h  the m a x i m i r a t i o n  principle, S) the gren* 
ert._ equilibrium thocrm (arbitrage—to insure uniform price: 
w i t h i n  the m t r h e t ) ,  9 )  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  competition, 1 0 )  
t h e  . c e p r o t u e t i o n  of Cournot ' s monopoly theory, and 11) the 
paraphrase of Cournot * s a n a l y s i s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange.
i h  h« h i d e s  o n  CO ' / r o t e  t h a t  b o t h  riarchall and
yo f  i n  f a c t  t h o r n  i s  a  c l e a r  historical
u. V i J
j cno
-y 1 7 /"h T'  ̂1 Q
iCisive influence we
27.
t/ O  C O -0 .1
( h e n  d o n  ; G e o r g e  . h l l e n  a n d  U r w i n ,  1 9 5 i )  , p. 174,
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
Izr.o'v to riUv'o Zz-ocn zcit by botn. bacn or tnera nêici 
rc r.c. Co'o.mot,
bo:.' al cb.G'tyb. oocb r.abes a rrecific acbnoxv— 
iobycr.rizo oo Courtot i t  io in each case couched 
in \-er\'- yonorc.! tcms. rhey each te ll us that 
s2 our.,iot s :'_0 'T: or oh sir izo:.' ':c use the dirf erentical 
calculas in econcrics, and this ray moan much or 
lior„c- but io is at least strihing that certain 
very oiynaricant elemenos of Cournot's mathematical 
economics ; y cine far beyoncl the mere idea of using 
ma'st e:,':r.oicaltohod, appear in i'alras and appear
the method used an balras' general equilibrium 
model came from Cournot‘s chapter on foredgn exchange* 
..'alras acsrûts thi;.: himself in his b l :':.XC-'Ls "than he refers 
has readers to Cournot‘ 3  general formula of exchange.
Co urns t ds'totos a s p e c i a l  chapter to exchange
'I-.-' _v "..v, rr - - t -p " ", "t ̂ - m — - -n ’•* “ ’! p ,0 c;
dm ihif- ihtrcc:" me _ Lcir..ib = - beg to refer the reader 
to this chapter for a fuller development of the 
.si to c.snfine m "Sulf to a restatement
..L iorttra of e:ccnange.29
ha.t o n e  c o u l d  build 
a  m o d e l  o f  . . m t u a l  i n d e r d o t o n d e n c y  i f  C o u r n o t ' s  methods were
f ’ f. '■< • . I - . -•Ad. mi#
t h e  bmc'mmrcr-'--presented the p r o b l e m ,  concepts, 
techniquesb u t  o n l y  f o r o s h a d o m e d  the method to be used.
I t  t c o h  a  l e s s e r  m a t h e m a t i c i a n  1 1 h e  :/alras, using a
, 'wdU J
4P
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D /
- i ' - ' v p l i ô r  f o r r a ,  'co c o , . \ p l o t e  t h e  c n c l y e i o . 3 u t  j u s t  how 
' / a s  tl'ULs c o u o ?
*-s i s  p o i n t  S t  c u t  i n  L a s s o n s  5 - 7  o f  t h o  71  o r i e n t  s  p 
i a i r a . s °  i h s o r y  o f  L t c h a n g e  a s s u r é e s  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  market 
w i t h  O t is ' -  w.;o coots. i u y e r s  a n t .  s e l l e r s  c o m p e t e  for good
here are trices but
no mono-fary unrt was used. la stzmds for the price of 
good .1 , and ?b for the price of good 3. If cf A is 
a::changed for n of 1  the foilC'ving ratios result:
?5 .  ̂ zi/lu and lb = rr./n, therefore Pa = l/?b or
■The principle arrived at from this e::ercise is that 
the trice of A is the inverse of the price of 3. If;
& t demanc cc. is Da
e quantity DP dorsandcd i s Db
of M t*offcrod is Oa
quantity of IDoffered is Ob,
principle oxierged. This says the demand for A is equal to 
the offer of 3 times the price of 3, (or Da = Ob * Pb) .
Thi5  is true from the assumption that a ll income is spent,
' two tcc'ds available 3 must decresisa if  A is to
ion shit of sutolv and demand holds
. fs vhth Db r- Oa " Pa, or Ca = Db/Pa. But 
Pb i t  follow's that Oa = Db * Pb. Thus :
“ i;.o - .L-o
Cb = Da - Pa
and 5 Db/':
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..'..c tills pcist, ..'c-lras irotder jc. whelher if  the 
es;..r.cvs:e s.l: hl bc solved situltoseously. Ihe cnhnox'/ns 
îs.'slc.erec. cl:;:— Db_, dê  db, Oo, and Oh. The equations 
olco ootaiec, cl:-::
1. ha = ?s(da)
2. hh = Ih(hh)
5 ..ha = Ohdh 
4w Dh = C o d a  
5. ha.dh = 1
£ - Ca - ha
hdov. this V/alras showed that these six equations were 
iaclspandeiit and the si./: unkncvms could be ascertained.
{l.ut there was no vway to detenr.ine if  these six equations 
are consistent. hit: independent equations are no indication
N.»*. » »- .. Cw-'. « t Lf, *._> aJu t i ® J
hro:n trh..'.. c:ln.ple heqinninq Tairas expanded his work.
hrooeedii::; as Cournot had taught hitq he developed the
dor.and l:u.:ctic-n fret individual u tility  schedules where
e.at_sfacticn is being' a.a::ia-hred. To expand his model
hs added more goods in the tari:et and again solved for the
31unh:no:nss using s-Ltultaneous equations.''
Cournot' o tuohange theory was based on the assump­
tion that n.oney was not shipped between countries in exchange 
for coots srarhd, and on the premise that the value of
a;.-:po.rts equaled tha value of imports. Surplus goods were
31pianta; op. 110%. ; p- 206.
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zr ether proclucrs of the trading country 
rn order to eiriciir.i r r cot of oatiof action. halras followed 
Cournot's aoour,pt:Lono ccrotly. Goods were traded for other 
goods to r.acrlLsioe oatr of action. The deriiand of any individual 
for a good was equal to the value of the good times the 
price cf she goods he sold. c7alras and Cournot used the 
sera method to detocraine value. halras used the price of 
one good in relation to another^ where Cournot used the
:nrnwe rare he tween co:'» la -S. Lzr tZj
Cournot o n l y  solved for one unTonov.Ti—the exchange 
rate on a. country. la took ra — the indebtedness of a 
country -— as given. In this way., he solved only for the 
exchange rate.4 or nr a ce ̂  not for the quantities traded, 
his equations listed the indeioedness of one country to
T' /-l'y I - t  -c- - ̂ UfV 4 Uf mm 9>-M f
V *i* •*•••¥ rf r̂l r̂l»
*>• • • • .+ ^
ion 1  shows that the
a. in'; o V- ui I-' V . » « ■> :n*i r ~ " 1 0 1  cm
2« ir.''- man . . .  4 :np̂  = r.u oc-, o
and GO on for aha r centers. Gquan
toual indebtedness of country m is mads up of what was
broughs from counszq/ 2  country 3, ...-j- country r, and
is equal so the value of its  sales to country 2  times the
owchang'e rate between i t  and country 2. This is repeated
32
w.. Uj 6
'''-Cournot 3 fW'. rgLt * 3 p.ll7-12cc «
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Walras* exchange equations are thus:
1 • Dab -f Dac -f- • . • + Dan = DbaPba 4 - DcaPca + . .. + DnaPna 
Dba 4* Dbc 4* • • . 4 * Dba = DabPab + DcbPcb + . . .+ DnbPnb 
and so on, for n nuitber of goods. Equation 1. shows the 
total deroand of the owner of good "a** as being made up of 
Ills purchased of b 4 - c 4 . . . . 4 . K, and is equal to sales he 
rrade of good "a" to the holder of good *’b** (Dba) , times 
the price of "a** in terms of ”b’*,(Pba), etc ., for *'n" 
number of goods.
Walras * equations are quite similar to Cournot*s. 
in fact there is but one important difference between the 
two* Cournot believed the exchange rate among the various 
countries to be dependent, subject to simultaneous deter­
mination* On the other hand, Walras incorporated both 
quantities and prices as dependent variables. Cournot 
invented his concept of arbitrage to demonstrate the mutual 
dependency of a ll cjxchange rates. Walras used the same 
concept but called i t  the general equilibriura theorgm I t  
established an interrelationship vjithin the- system of prices 
such that arbitrage was not profitable.
After this comparison of Cournot*s and Walras* wrks 
i t  can definitely be claimed that Cournot %vas a major influence 
upon Walras and his Elements. Towards the end of Walras*
33Walras, c i t . , p. 162.
R ep ro d u ced  with p erm issio n  o f  th e  copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction  prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
6 1
1-3 1 . 0  o'-cr/L Ci grcol coal o f  oino rovieo-ing Ins accoraplish- 
r.lc. Ic; caclg c.lsccvorod t o a t  t h e  c l a i m s  to fame he once 
o u g h t  V / i r e  h i s  a l o n e  \ ; c r a  n o n  s u s  j  s e t  to question because 
' l y  t i s G Q v e r o i  p r e d e c e s s o r s . h e  c l u n g  to the one 
:y  t h c i u  ho c l o d  mod t o  h a v e  i n v e n t e d —  his general 
c q o d l i b r i u s i  a n a l y s i s *  h e  even c n o s e  to have this fact
boon -.alrao is vsrv de servi no of the honors
u_-on him̂  for his gen-oral ccgar librium analysis 
a much broader no re detailed, highly refined, and 
mplicatcd model « hum Courr.ot must be given credit for 
iginating the concepc, defining the problem, and 
oviding the concoots and methods later adooted in the
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c . z / . a" :  .,uc.:c'cir* Course-'; -,.i::.j v:zy “ADCt-irr; for l;is day.
 ̂orcr 3 I f f  I- fha cconorfc orcf ocsion cone f'd 3 red id 
of: CO r col coil y i" coi ci oo deal ooily i,;ido. oco t:;o oiarket.
CO' oroLoo o of yore ooonoooly arc yore coooc edit ion. Classical 
A.oi roc era soi oar ocoLAoocors o.sually assooicd fines were 
oureiv coriooti-orvo. Clo.ooical coor.c.ar sd,s realised monopoly 
c:.i 3 oedj, 'ror ôr,.oy cor ordered, dr.c coovoedidive ioodel do be 
drc rood looofrl cool for ccorooiic analysis. Pure comped- 
idror r.o.y hrv... beer easier do 'corb I'fidh dhan duopoly and 
oligopoly, bud curb a rarbod ciaecificadion as pure 
cor.':pedition did rod c.oply do dbo real world.
Courrod’s duopoly problcrc die provide a narked 
clacciiication dbad corrosponc.cd irore closely widh the 
rm l world dhan earlier classifications. "Jidn the ea:pansion 
of hi s duopoly dheorp- do oligopol;^  ̂ Coua-not was as modern 
c ;• CO day. .•To r-.-.alor h fa 1 1 1 1  dhrd reithsr pure compet­
ition nor cure a.onoyaly \rore likely to last. Some form 
cf :..ar:vsd cla,.:vificacion nust pro-'ice insights for the 
solution cf real b coined,e prcbl on.s . Cournot's duopoly 
uhaory -w.a such an addcnpt. Id is s t i l l  used today as the
In analyr ing Cournot ' s duopoly dh.eory and Cournot's 
i:'_f lu.en CO upon later oconcr.;i sds 1  have tried do show that
of our ores end ba,3 ic oconomi c orinciples have originated
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-'C'.ï. -chic onco unknovrn Frc-icci-unaa. Cournot ' s functional 
ne CO.tien cf tho donand curve relating the tv;o variables*—* 
grâce and quantity— is fully accepted today in all modern 
economic -chocry. Cournot’s behavioral assumption that 
th;o economic man is ci ma;-f,-mizer is also g-enerally accepted, 
from Cournot’s partial equilibrium analysis Trairas 
developed a general equilibrium theory that could be 
s.pplied to the entire economic system. Cournot v̂ as also 
interested in probabili'cy theory v/hicii has been e:<panded 
today into Game ‘Theory.
Cournot Ccin be credited with much when he analyzed 
a dor.Tinan-i real-world .maxicet forra. liis assumptions tended 
to limit the conclusions possible^, but i t  x-ras a beginning 
of truly useful analysis. Gince Cournot’s work we have 
discovered that the number of as sumption s •v.hich might 
be made about the behavior of oligopolists is'large.
Cournot * s model was determinant, but as the modal becomes 
rxore realistic  the theory becomes less determinant.
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